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The Redemption Puzzle
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Before 2003, a common theme of tax and corporate law
scholarship was the ‘‘dividend puzzle.’’1 The dividend
puzzle referred to the tendency of U.S. public corpora-
tions to pay dividends to their shareholders despite the
fact that until 2003 dividends were subject to a signifi-
cantly higher level of tax than redemptions. For a pub-
licly traded corporation, it is easy to structure an open-
market share repurchase program in a way that ensures
that shareholders who participate and offer their shares
for redemption would qualify for capital gain treatment
under section 302(b). Because redemption treatment per-
mitted shareholders to both qualify for the lower capital
gain tax rate and use part of their basis, whereas divi-
dend treatment resulted in both a higher tax rate for
upper-bracket taxable shareholders and no offset for
basis, the question arose why public corporations ever
paid out dividends.
Various explanations have been given for this puzzle,
and I will not go into them here.2 Importantly, the factual
background underlying the puzzle changed in 2003,
when Congress amended the code to provide (through
2010) the same 15 percent rate for dividends and for
capital gains. Part of the rationale for this adoption of
partial corporate/shareholder tax integration was that
the higher dividend rate encouraged corporations to
needlessly retain earnings, even though public corpora-
tions could achieve the same result via redemptions.3
This paper briefly explores what happened after 2003.
A recent article by William W. Bratton and Michael L.
Wachter summarizes the later developments as follows:
Figure 1 tracks shareholder payouts in the form of
dividends and stock repurchases by the companies
in the S&P 500 from 1987 to 2007. 1987 is taken as
the start date because it marks the beginning of a
three-decade trend of increased resort to open-
market repurchases by public companies. The 1987
year-end S&P 500 average (247), the companies’
total annual dividend payments in 1987 ($44.3
billion), and their 1987 total repurchases ($32.5
billion) are pegged at 100 on the vertical axis.
Figure 1 shows relative increases and decreases to
2008, when the S&P 500 closed at 366, total divi-
dends were $247 billion, and total repurchases were
$340 billion.4
A break in two long-standing trends occurred in
2004. Before 2004, increases in levels of dividends
and levels of repurchases roughly tracked increases
in stock prices (with both tending to lag behind the
market). There was also a trend of rough parity
between total dividends and total repurchases.
Both trends ended in 2003 in favor of an increase in
net amounts paid out, with the lion’s share of the
increase in the form of repurchases. In 1987 repur-
chases amounted to 1.6 percent of average market
capitalization, and total payout amounted to 3.8
percent; in 2007 repurchases amounted to 4.6 per-
cent, and total payout amounted to 6.3 percent. The
dollar amount of annual repurchases increased
eighteenfold from 1987 to the peak year of 2007.
The data assembled by Bratton and Wachter indicate a
remarkable fact: Following the adoption of partial inte-
gration, there was only a modest increase in dividends
during the period 2004-2007, from about 300 to about 500
(if 1987 levels are set at 100). Redemptions, however,
showed a remarkable increase, jumping from about the
same as dividends (300) to 1,800.5 This, therefore, leads to
a new puzzle: Why the sudden sharp increase in redemp-
tions after 2003?
Bratton and Wachter explain the total increase in both
types of distribution as a response by public corporations
1William W. Bratton, ‘‘The New Dividend Puzzle,’’ 93 Geo.
L.J. 845, 849-852 (2005).
2Id.
3I am doubtful this rationale was convincing, and in fact the
data show that an increase in dividend payouts started before
2003 and continued thereafter, so it is unclear whether adopting
integration actually encouraged dividend payouts. Nor do I
find the other reasons to adopt integration particularly convinc-
ing. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Back to the 1930s? The Shaky
Case for Exempting Dividends,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 23, 2002, p.
1599, Doc 2002-27880, or 2002 TNT 247-29.
4Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, ‘‘The Case Against Share-
holder Empowerment,’’ 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 653 (2010), 685-686.
5Both forms of payouts declined sharply in 2008 as the result
of the financial crisis, but are likely to grow again in 2010.
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Professor
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After the adoption of partial integration in 2003,
there has been only a modest rise in dividends, but a
sixfold increase in redemptions. This article argues
that the explanation for that lies in the different
treatment of dividends and capital gains to foreign
shareholders and that Congress should respond by
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to increased pressure by shareholders to distribute earn-
ings. This pressure came especially from hedge funds,
which played an increasingly important role as share-
holder activists during this period.6
But this hypothesis, while persuasive, does not ex-
plain the form of the distributions. Why engage in more
redemptions precisely when the tax bias against divi-
dends was reduced? This is the ‘‘redemption puzzle.’’
Like the dividend puzzle, the redemption puzzle is
susceptible to several explanations. For example, Bratton
and Wachter note that managers who hold stock options
tend to favor redemptions over dividends.7 But in this
case, I believe there is also a tax explanation for the
puzzle, related to the different treatment of redemptions
and dividends to foreign shareholders.
In the case of taxable U.S. shareholders, under post-
2003 law, a dividend and a redemption that qualify as a
capital gain transaction under one of the tests set out in
section 302(b) are both taxed at 15 percent. The only
difference is that in a qualifying redemption taxpayers
may offset basis, which has led some commentators to
suggest erasing this remaining difference.8 However, it
seems unlikely that this basis offset is enough to explain
the remarkable post-2003 preference for redemptions.
For foreign shareholders, on the other hand, a signifi-
cant difference remains between redemptions and divi-
dends after 2003. A redemption that qualifies as a capital
gain transaction would result in no tax to a foreign
shareholder because capital gains are generally sourced
to the residence of the seller. A dividend by a U.S.
corporation, on the other hand, is subject to a withhold-
ing tax of 30 percent (reduced to 15 percent under
treaties, but not below that).
If Bratton and Wachter are correct in attributing most
of the post-2003 increase in total corporate payouts to
pressure from hedge funds, then this difference in the
treatment of foreign shareholders may account for a sig-
nificant part of the preference for redemptions, and there-
fore help resolve the redemption puzzle. Most hedge
funds operate offshore for both tax and regulatory rea-
sons, and therefore dividend payouts to them would gen-
erally be subject to the 30 percent withholding tax (and
generally not the lower 15 percent treaty rate, because
most of them are in nontreaty jurisdictions). Redemptions,
on the other hand, would not be subject to tax.
A recent report by the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on In-
vestigations has illustrated the tax sensitivity of foreign
hedge funds to dividend withholding taxes.9 The report
showed that many foreign-based hedge funds avoided
withholding taxes on dividends by instead holding total
return equity swaps on the equity of U.S. corporations.
Before 2010, payments of dividend equivalents on such
swaps were deemed not to be U.S. source and therefore
6Bratton, ‘‘Hedge Funds and Governance Targets,’’ 95 Geo.
L.J. 1375 (2007).
7Bratton and Wachter, supra note 4.
8Ethan Yale, ‘‘A Better Way to Tax Corporate Distributions:
Allow Basis Recovery on Ordinary Dividends,’’ working paper
(2010).
9See Avi-Yonah, Testimony on Dividend Tax Abuse, U.S.
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Sept. 11,
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were not subject to withholding tax, even though they
were economically equivalent to the dividends on the
underlying stock. This finding led Congress to enact
section 871(l) in 2010, subjecting most dividend equiva-
lents to withholding tax.
If I am correct in supposing that foreign hedge funds
are a primary beneficiary of the recent rise in redemp-
tions, I would suggest that Congress take one further step
by excluding foreign shareholders from the scope of
sections 302 and 304. The result would be that redemp-
tion payments by U.S. corporations to foreign share-
holders would be treated as dividends and subject to
withholding tax, thus eliminating the bias in favor of
redemptions.
To understand this proposal, it is important to step back
and ask why dividends and capital gains are treated dif-
ferently for foreign shareholders. After all, a capital gain
is simply the sum of the value of the current earnings of
a corporation plus the present value of its future earnings,
and both of those are the funds from which dividends are
paid. Thus, as an economic matter, dividends should be
treated in the same way as capital gains.
In the case of foreign shareholders, however, there is
an important administrability difference between divi-
dends and capital gains. Dividends are paid out by a U.S.
corporation and therefore can easily be subject to a
withholding tax. Capital gains, however, result from a
sale that may occur offshore between a foreign seller and
buyer of the U.S. corporation’s stock. Such a sale is
difficult to subject to withholding tax in most cases.10
Therefore, capital gains have always been excluded from
the scope of fixed or determinable annual or periodic
income that is subject to withholding under sections 871
and 881, and in most cases have also been deemed to be
foreign source.
However, this rationale does not apply in the case of
redemptions. In a redemption, the U.S. corporation is the
source of the funds that are paid to the foreign share-
holder, just as it is in the case of a dividend. In both
situations, the funds can easily be subject to withhold-
ing.11
The reason redemptions are not subject to withholding
under current law is that section 302 (and its corollary in
section 304) have not explicitly been limited to taxable
U.S. shareholders, even though that was clearly Con-
gress’s intent. Section 302 was intended to prevent tax-
able U.S. shareholders from ‘‘bailing out’’ earnings and
profits at the capital gains rate by means of redemptions,
and section 304 has the same intent for sales between
commonly controlled corporations.
The application of sections 302 and 304 to foreign share-
holders and foreign corporations has already had several
perverse effects that are unrelated to the redemption
puzzle. The application of section 304 to foreign corpo-
rations has enabled U.S. corporate shareholders to repa-
triate profits as deemed dividends while avoiding the
foreign tax credit limitations.12 The application of section
302 to foreign corporations and foreign shareholders was
a core part of the notorious KPMG foreign leveraged in-
vestment program tax shelter.13 In both cases, the IRS was
limited in its ability to argue against the inappropriate
results because it had approved the application of section
304 to foreign corporations in some cases.
The solution is congressional action. Congress should
simply modify sections 302 and 304 by excluding foreign
shareholders from their scope, just like it did in section
367 regarding reorganization provisions. Arguably, tax-
exempt domestic shareholders should be excluded as
well, for the same reason: Sections 302 and 304 were
drafted with taxable U.S. shareholders in mind.
This would not be a revenue raiser, because presum-
ably foreign shareholders would simply sell their shares
to other foreigners rather than participate in redemptions
subject to withholding tax. But it would relieve the
tax-induced pressure on corporate management to struc-
ture distributions as redemptions rather than dividends.
Excessive pressure on corporate management to distrib-
ute earnings in any form may lead to short-term behav-
ior, as Bratton and Wachter point out.14 But even if one
believes that distributions are appropriate, there is no
reason to have tax-based distinctions between otherwise
identical forms of distribution.
Of course, if Congress were to make the 15 percent
rate for dividends permanent, it could go further and
repeal sections 302 and 304 (as well as other complex
provisions like sections 306 and 344). But this seems
unlikely at present, and in fact if Congress does nothing
this year the full rate differential for dividends comes
back in 2011. This would put further pressure on sections
302 and 304 and exacerbate the tendency to favor re-
demptions over dividends.
We have gone from a dividend puzzle to a redemption
puzzle, but perhaps the redemption puzzle is easier to
solve. Congress should act to make both things of the
past by equalizing the rates on redemptions and divi-
dends for both domestic and foreign shareholders.15 For
domestic shareholders the solution is to make the rate
equalization of current law permanent. For foreign share-
holders, since we cannot as an administrative matter tax
all capital gains, we should at least tax redemptions in the
same way we tax dividends.
10The exception is when the buyer cares about the transfer of
an underlying asset, such as title to U.S. real estate, which has
been subject to withholding tax since 1980. Similarly, many
countries subject sales of large corporate participations to tax
because the buyer cares about the transfer of the vote, and I
would support such a move for the United States as well
(subject to our treaty obligations).
11It may be necessary to require a statement of U.S. owner-
ship in the case of redemptions, like the one that applies to
transfers of stock in potential U.S. real property holding com-
panies, so that the U.S. payer knows if it has to withhold.
12Charles Kingson, ‘‘Bhada and Zero Basis,’’ Tax Notes, Mar. 5,
2007, p. 961, Doc 2007-4945, 2007 TNT 44-42.
13Calvin Johnson, ‘‘Tales From the KPMG Skunk Works: The
Basis-Shift or Defective-Redemption Shelter,’’ Tax Notes, July 25,
2005, p. 431, Doc 2005-14507, 2005 TNT 142-30.
14Bratton and Wachter, supra.
15And possibly eliminate the basis recovery distinction as
well; see Yale, supra note 7.
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